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Abstract:Governmental and private programs that pay next of kin who give permission for the removal of their deceased rela-
tive’s organs for transplantation exist in a number of countries. Such payments, which may be given to the relatives or paid directly
for funeral expenses or hospital bills unrelated to being a donor, aim to increase the rate of donation. The Declaration of Istanbul
Custodian Group—in alignment with the World Health Organization Guiding Principles and the Council of Europe Convention
Against Trafficking in Human Organs—has adopted a new policy statement opposing such practices. Payment programs are un-
wise because they produce a lower rate of donations than in countries with voluntary, unpaid programs; associate deceased do-
nation with being poor and marginal in society; undermine public trust in the determination of death; and raise doubts about fair
allocation of organs. Most important, allowing families to receive money for donation from a deceased person, who is at no risk of
harm, will make it impossible to sustain prohibitions on paying living donors, who are at risk. Payment programs are also unethical.
Tying coverage for funeral expenses or healthcare costs to a family allowing organs to be procured is exploitative, not “charitable.”
Using payment to overcome reluctance to donate based on cultural or religious beliefs especially offends principles of liberty and dig-
nity. Finally, while it is appropriate to make donation “financially neutral”—by reimbursing the added medical costs of evaluating and
maintaining a patient as a potential donor—such reimbursement may never be conditioned on a family agreeing to donate.
(Transplantation 2016;100: 2006–2009)The Declaration of Istanbul holds that successful and sus-tainable programs of organ donation and transplanta-
tion must embody “the principles of equity, justice and
respect for human dignity” and cannot be built on “trans-
plant commercialism.”1 The latter, which occurs when those
who provide organs receive “material gain,” inevitably “tar-
gets impoverished and otherwise vulnerable donors” and thus
“leads inexorably to inequity and injustice and should be
prohibited.”1 The Declaration’s conclusion is consistent with
the Resolution adopted in May 2010 by the World Health
Assembly reaffirming that the principles of human dignity
and solidarity “condemn the buying of human body partsReceived 8 November 2015. Revision requested 21 December 2015.
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2006 www.transplantjournal.comfor transplantation and the exploitation of the poorest and
most vulnerable populations.”2 The international summit
meeting at which the Declaration was adopted in 2008 ad-
dressed living donation.3 The present statement extends
the Declaration’s ethical precepts to deceased donation.
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE CURRENT PROBLEM:
MAKING PAYMENTS TO OR FOR THE BENEFIT
OF NEXT OF KIN
In some countries in the Middle East, Asia, and the
Americas, existing or newly established programs for obtaining
organs from deceased persons provide cash payments to fam-
ilies that donate their deceased relative’s organs or pay sums
on their behalf for funeral costs or for hospital expenses be-
yond those generated in the process of obtaining organs for
transplantation. Officials in these countries have set up suchDisclosure: As a co-author, J.C. did not participate in any fashion in the editorial
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without such financial incentives, sufficient organs would not
be donated. They contend that money is needed to obtain
agreement from people who otherwise feel no inclination to
help facilitate organ transplants to which they lack access or
who regard deceased donation as inconsistent with their cul-
tural traditions. Officials have also explained the payments
as appropriate reciprocity for the family’s “gift” to the com-
munity, especially when the next of kin are poor or face large
medical or other expenses.
Without doubting the sincerity of these beliefs, the Decla-
ration of Istanbul Custodian Group has concluded that all
programs that provide payments to or on behalf of families
who have donated organs from their deceased relatives place
the countries involved outside the circle of ethical transplant
practices globally, as set forth in the Guiding Principles on
Cell, Tissue, and Organ Transplantation4 of theWorld Health
Organization (WHO), the Declaration of Istanbul, and other
international standards.
II. ETHICAL PRINCIPLE
Providing money to people to encourage them to consent
to organ removal or reward them for doing so weakens organ
donation programs by treating the human body as a commod-
ity used for financial gain, exploits the economic vulnerability
of living donors and deceased donor families, and undermines
equality and justice by reinforcing rather than reducing socio-
economic inequities.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO
DECEASED DONATION
A. Payments to Next of Kin Fall into the Category of
Organ Commercialism
1. Direct or indirect payments to donor families consti-
tute transplant commercialism. Payments made to or on
behalf of donor families amount to purchasing organs be-
cause consent to organ donation “gives rise to financial gain
or comparable advantage.”5 Such transactions are sales, and
it is deceptive to present the payment as a “gift” or “re-
ward.”6 As stated by the WHO, countries “should ensure
that any gifts or rewards are not, in fact, disguised forms of
payment” for organs and “‘rewards’ with monetary value
that can be transferred to third parties are not different from
monetary payments.”4
2. The payment source is irrelevant. The origin andmethod
of the payments—whether the government, a public or private
foundation, or individuals (such as organ recipients)—are un-
important ethically, because in all cases the financial arrange-
ments depend on the family agreeing to donate a deceased
relative’s organs.
3.Once payments to next of kin are permitted, no ethical
principle exists for determining whether the amount is
appropriate or excessive. Unlike reimbursing hospital and
other expenses that donors incur in the process of being eval-
uated or in actually donating, which are acceptable when
based on actual costs, the amounts paid to the next of kin have
no inherent limit. Payments to incentivize donations will be
set based on market forces (that is, the payers will choose
the amount needed to obtain consent, which will vary basedon donor families’ financial needs); “charity” payments de-
pend on the extent to that officials choose to relieve donor
families’ poverty; and payments for funeral costs and hospi-
tal care (beyond any added costs for organ donation) can
vary widely and, moreover, those items are not distinguish-
able from other debts that the family might prefer to have
paid. In sum, the amounts paid to families on any of these
grounds are inherently arbitrary and subject to manipulation
and abuse.
B. Adverse Effects on Society and Legitimate
Transplant Programs
4. Payments undermine trust in death determinations.
Although it is physicians who diagnose death, the next of
kin also have a role to play when the diagnosis will be
followed by organ donation. With brain-based determina-
tions of death, the familymust accept the diagnosis and allow
medical interventions to be withdrawn before organs can be
recovered, and with circulatory-determinations of death, the
diagnosis is made only when the patient’s circulation and
respiration have permanently ceased, following the family’s
agreement to the withdrawal of life-support. As experienced
organ procurement staff recognize, families’ involvement
must be handled with sensitivity and always framed in terms
of their deciding what is in the patient’s best interests. Further
complexity is added when the methods that physicians use to
diagnose death, especially based on loss of brain functions,
are unfamiliar to or not yet broadly accepted by the general
population. Making payments to the next of kin who con-
sent to donate organs, which has to be preceded by their de-
cision to withdraw medical interventions, creates an obvious
conflict of interest and raises questions for the public about
whether decisions about care are being made in patients’
best interests and whether death has truly occurred before
organs are removed.
5. Paying for deceased donation will adversely affect liv-
ing donation. When next of kin receive financial incentives
and rewards, it becomes impossible to refuse to pay living do-
nors both because the money provided to the families legiti-
mates exchanging organs for material gain, and because a
society that allows payments to next of kin, who bear no phys-
ical risk, cannot reasonably refuse to allow at least equal pay-
ment to living donors, who take on actual burdens and risks
in donating.
6. Payments to next of kin undermine public support of
transplant programs. Most basically, payments suggest to
the public that all types of organ donation are not acts one
should undertake as a matter of civic duty and in solidarity
with the needs of one's fellow citizens but instead something
that a person should do only for a financial benefit.
7. Payments for organs raise doubts about fair alloca-
tion. When organs are obtained through payments, they
have become commodities, which—for good reason, in
light of experience in systems where organs are treated that
way—fosters a public perception that their distribution will
also be determined by financial considerations, thereby weak-
ening general support for organ donation as a community re-
source that is necessary if transplant programs are to fully
and equitably meet the needs of patients.
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donation rates. The countries with the highest or most rap-
idly increasing donation rates do not provide financial incen-
tives or gratuities for deceased donation.7 Instead, better
donation rates depend on improved organ procurement prac-
tices, engagement of the critical care community, and public
education.8,9 The exclusion of payments in these countries,
which are found in most regions of the world, is not based
on particular cultural norms but on universal principles of
ethics and human rights that uphold the dignity of human be-
ings and aim to protect them against exploitation.
C. Adverse Impact on Donor Families
9. Dynamics among donor relatives can be destructive.
Making payments to the next of kin for donating organs
can provoke arguments within families over the manner in
which the money is distributed among family members and
over the adequacy of the amount received—for example, if
permission were given to remove more organs from the
deceased could family members receive a bigger financial ex-
pression of “gratitude” or “charitable relief”? Such disputes
at the bedside of potential donors are harmful to a dignified
dying process for the donor as well as to other patients and
families in the hospital unit. After the fact, disgruntled family
members may institute legal proceedings against the physi-
cians, nurses, hospitals, organ procurement agency, and others
involved in making or condoning the payment to a particular
next of kin.10
10. Payment programs can stigmatize all donors. Espe-
cially in countries where deceased donation is not yet widely
adopted, receiving financial incentives or rewards sets mem-
bers of donor families apart from others in society; even fam-
ily members who do not accept payment may be seen—or
fear they will be seen—as having done for money something
that successful and reputable people would not do.11,12
11. Payments to next of kin change the relationship be-
tween society and donors. What would otherwise be a
praiseworthy act of gift-giving is transformed into a commer-
cial transaction, which explains families bargaining for in-
creased payment if they allow more organs to be harvested.
D. Ethical Objections to Payments
12. Achieving basic dignity should not require people to
provide donor organs. Ensuring proper burial or cremation
for all those who die is a basic feature of decent societies. In
settings where this does not occur because of the general con-
ditions or the poverty of some families, it is coercive for a de-
ceased donation program to offer to cover funeral expenses
only for families that allow organs to be procured from their
deceased relatives. It likewise is wrong to condition access
to healthcare—or relief from bearing the cost of such care—
on the next of kin agreeing to donate organs. All such prac-
tices violate the requirement of voluntary informed con-
sent to donation set forth in the WHO Guiding Principles
and the Declaration of Istanbul. Further, a just society would
never condition the important benefits it makes available
to grieving families upon their agreeing to part with a rela-
tive’s organs.
13. Payments based on the recipient having donated or-
gans are the antithesis of charity. Attempting to justifypayments as “charitable gifts”merely underlines the exploita-
tion because acting generously toward the poor can never
involve extracting something of material value from the sup-
posed beneficiaries. Further, whenever a person has truly
made a gift, responding with money turns the act of giving
into a pecuniary exchange, in which case either party would
then be justified in saying that the gift deserved more money
or the payment merited a bigger gift.
14. Paying for funeral or medical expenses of deceased
donors is doubly unjust. Making payment depend on con-
sent not only exploits the financial need of donor families but
also provides nothing to other needy families who did not au-
thorize donation or are perhaps not even able to do so be-
cause their deceased relative was not a suitable donor.
15. Payments designed to get people to act against their
beliefs are especially wrong.When some people have strong
cultural, moral, or personal reasons why they are unwilling to
do something, it especially offends principles of liberty and
dignity to induce them to act against their beliefs by offering
them an amount of money that would be difficult or impossi-
ble for them to refuse, given their financial straits. The offense
is especially pronounced in societies with wide variations in
wealth, where financially privileged persons would have no
need to compromise their objections to acting in the way that
poor persons are induced to act.
16. Reimbursement of donation-related expenses should
not turn on giving consent. As both the WHO Guiding
Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul make clear, prohi-
bitions on paying for donation do not preclude keeping or-
gan donation a financially neutral act by reimbursing the
reasonable and verifiable expenses incurred.13 In the con-
text of deceased donation, it is therefore wholly acceptable
for a transplant program to pay the hospital where a poten-
tial deceased donor has received medical care for any added
costs of evaluating and maintaining the patient as a donor
and tocover any costs the next of kin incur toparticipate inde-
cisions aboutwhether or not todonateorgans, such as the cost
of coming to the hospital to speak with organ procurement
personnel. It is not, however, acceptable to withhold such re-
imbursement of expenses should the family decide not to do-
nate, nor to include in those expenses anything for funeral
costs or hospital charges not connected with the donation of
organs—that is, expenses thatwould have arisen even if organ
donation were not being considered for that patient.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
For all of these reasons, countries should not establish or
allow others to operate public or private programs that pay
money to, or for the benefit of, next of kin who consent to do-
nate their deceased relative’s organs, whether such payments
are for funeral expenses, to cover charges for predonation
hospital care, to relieve their poverty, or especially to incentivize
their decision. Countries that rely on such financial gifts, re-
wards, and incentives for deceased donation undermine their
chance of building a transplant program that accords with
global ethical and human rights standards; instead, they are
in effect announcing that the economic and social marginali-
zation of large portions of their population precludes them
even trying to create such a program. Moreover, experience
shows that a later decision to stop paying will necessitate
© 2016 Wolters Kluwer Capron et al 2009organ donation programs having to expend great—and not
necessarily successful—efforts to reverse the public expecta-
tion that such a payment will be forthcoming for organs from
deceased relatives.
In place of payment programs, the Declaration of Istanbul
Custodian Group works to support transplant professionals
and government officials around the world who share a com-
mitment to creating national systems of voluntary, unpaid or-
gan donation that are adapted to local conditions and that
can successfully advance each country toward “self-sufficiency”
in transplantation without exploiting its poorest and most
vulnerable citizens.14 To be truly effective and sustainable, as
well as ethical, the incentive to donate cannot be external, in
the form of a payment on behalf of those who have access to
transplants to those who do not, but rather internal, in the
form both of the psychic rewards of demonstrating gener-
osity toward those in one’s community who need a life-
saving organ, and of reciprocity, which occurs when all those
asked to be donors are also eligible to be recipients.
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